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AGENDA CONTROL AND RECIPROCITY IN SEQUENTIAL
VOTING DECISIONS
URS FISCHBACHER and SIMEON SCHUDY∗
We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control
over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals.
We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote
trading coalitions favoring early proposals not only when the sequence of proposals
is exogenously given, but also when a chair controls the sequence of proposals. Vote
trading occurs even though chairs manipulate the agenda in their favor. Punishment for
chairs exploiting agenda control is weak as chairs reciprocate support by others more
frequently than nonchairs. (JEL C92, D71, D72)
I. INTRODUCTION
Committees frequently decide sequentially
on series of independent binary proposals. In
politics, committees vote sequentially on inde-
pendent issues (such as funding for highways
in region A, bridges in region B, and dams in
region C).1 In firms, committees decide on dif-
ferent projects sequentially. And in universities
and public institutions, committees sequentially
accept or reject applicants for several open posi-
tions. In all these situations, committee chairs
who control the agenda are likely to attempt
moving the outcome of the decision-making pro-
cedure in the direction of their own interest (fre-
quently at the cost of others). Classical economic
theory provides some guidance, under which vot-
ing mechanisms agenda manipulation is possible,
but neglects that social preferences, may generate
additional opportunities for agenda manipula-
tion. This study highlights the important role
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of reciprocity (see also Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Levine
1998; Rabin 1993) in such voting decisions.
The extent to which a committee chair may
manipulate an agenda can vary extensively,
depending on the institutional framework as well
as on the preferences of committee members.
Chairs may determine what voting procedure
is used, what subset of possible alternatives in
addition to the status quo is voted on, they may
be the only person who is able to add alternatives
to an otherwise fixed set of proposals (i.e., have
proposal power) or they may solely control the
sequence in which independent proposals are
voted on (see also Miller 1995). From a classical
economic point of view, committee chairs can
move the outcome of a decision-making proce-
dure in the direction of their interest, in particular,
if they have control over voting procedures or
have proposal power (see Agranov, Cotton,
and Tergiman 2016; Baranski 2016; Baranski
and Kagel 2015; Baron and Ferejohn 1989;
Cox and McCubbins 2005; Diermeier and Mor-
ton 2005; Frechette, Kagel, and Morelli 2005;
Romer and Rosenthal 1978). Instead, if chairs
solely control the sequence of a given set of
independent binary proposals, there is less room
for manipulation. In particular, such agenda
control does not empower a committee chair, if
members are rational and selfish and the commit-
tee votes on a series of binary proposals with a
finite time horizon in which commitment devices
are missing.
Experimental evidence suggests that control-
ling the sequence of proposals may actually
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members are reciprocal.2 Given an exogenously
determined finite voting agenda, reciprocal com-
mittee members are able to form vote trading
coalitions that make proposals early on the
agenda more likely to be passed (Fischbacher
and Schudy 2014). In turn, chairs may benefit
from putting their favorite proposals early on the
agenda. However, it is unclear whether such vote
trading coalitions still emerge, if the agenda is
determined endogenously. Can a committee chair
exploit her agenda control in such an environ-
ment or do reciprocal committee members punish
chairs who exploit their power over the agenda
and thereby deter strategic agenda setting?
This article studies the above questions empir-
ically; in a simple experimental voting game.
In this game, vote trading, and, in turn, agenda
manipulation, cannot occur when the committee
is comprised of selfish members but vote trading
can occur, if committee members are reciprocal.
Thereby, the game allows for isolating the impact
of reciprocity on agenda setting possibilities. In
the experiment, a small committee decides on a
series of binary proposals using simple majority
rule and any subset of proposals can pass or fail.
We contrast experimental treatments in which
a committee chair can control the sequence in
which the proposals are voted on with treatments,
in which the agenda is randomly determined.3
Additionally, we vary the information that is
available about voting behavior. In a secret
ballot treatment, committee members are only
informed about the outcome of a vote. In an open
ballot treatment, individual voting behavior is
observable. The latter two conditions allow us
to exogenously change the extent to which com-
mittee members can direct reward for support by
others and thereby allow us to exogenously vary
by how much the voting environment allows for
trust and reciprocity to matter.
We find that vote trading coalitions based
on trust and reciprocity emerge both, when the
agenda is determined exogenously and endoge-
nously. Even if committee chairs take advantage
of their power to determine the agenda, vote trad-
ing coalitions that favor early proposals occur
frequently. Thus, agenda manipulation turns out
2. Reciprocal relationships in real-world policymaking
have been documented (see Stratmann 1992 or Dreher, Sturm,
and Vreeland 2009), but their implications for agenda control
are difficult to identify with observational data.
3. In the Chair conditions, we randomly select one par-
ticipant in each group, who assumes and keeps the role of the
committee chair for the whole experiment. Committee mem-
bers are randomly rematched.
to be profitable, particularly when information
on individual voting behavior is available. First,
transparency provides accountability and thereby
facilitates vote trading. Second, for nonchairs, the
opportunity costs of not voting for the chair’s pro-
posal are higher because, with full information
about individual votes, chairs can directly iden-
tify who did not support their preferred proposal.
While reciprocal committee members
empower committee chairs by making vote
trading coalitions based on trust and reciprocity
feasible, they are also likely to reciprocate, that
is, to punish or reward agenda manipulation.
We find that nonchairs do not generally dislike
agenda manipulation. Instead they attribute credit
(or blame) to the chair according to their own
benefits (or costs) from the chosen agenda. Bene-
ficiaries of a chosen agenda discriminate in favor
of the chair, that is, they vote more frequently for
the chair’s proposal. Members who suffer from
the chosen agenda, instead, vote less frequently
for the chair’s proposal. This attribution of blame
does occur mostly if individual votes are not
observable and is not sufficient to stop chairs
from choosing a sequence that favors their own
proposal. Interestingly, we also find that chairs
do not fully exploit their counterparts. While
in the agenda setting decision, most of chairs
behave selfishly, in the voting decision, chairs
compensate their counterparts by rewarding
support more frequently than nonchairs.
Overall, our results suggest that vote trading
based on trust and reciprocity is more likely to
occur in situations in which a committee chair
determines the agenda. Compared to an exoge-
nous agenda more proposals are passed. Two
different channels can contribute to this result.
First, the opportunity of a chair to set the agenda
is likely to make vote trading opportunities more
salient. In turn, more committee members may
vote for proposals that precede the proposal they
favor themselves, that is they trust more, when
the agenda is determined by an agenda setter.
Second, agenda setters may feel more respon-
sible to reward support of others. Our results
show that the increase in trust is dampened
by negative reactions of committee members,
whose proposals are placed last on the agenda,
whereas reward behavior increases with an
agenda setter.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Agenda control has been considered a pow-
erful tool in political decision-making. Tsebelis
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and Proksch (2007) even argued it was the use
of agenda control which made the success of
the European Convention in producing a con-
stitutional treaty possible. Traditionally, agenda
control has been studied in situations in which
a voting body decides on different alternatives
of a single decision (see e.g., early work by
Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975), McKelvey
(1976), Ordeshook and Palfrey (1988), or Dutta,
Jackson, and Breton (2004).4 While in such cases
reciprocity plays a minor role because committee
members’ possibilities to punish or reward are
rather restricted, our work focuses on situations in
which trust and reciprocity are more likely to play
a role. We provide evidence in which decision
environments reciprocity is likely to generate
additional possibilities for agenda manipulation
and study whether committee chairs are willing
and able to exploit such opportunities. As we
focus on sequential voting on a series of binary
proposals, our study relates closely to the work
by Casella (2011). She studies sequential vot-
ing on a known series of binary proposals in a
secret ballot. In contrast to our setup, committee
members’ preferences over proposals are private
information in her setting. While her main focus
is on whether storable votes provide welfare
gains over simple majority voting, she sheds also
some light on whether agenda control matters in
voting on a series of binary proposals. She con-
trasts conditions in which either a random device
or a committee chair determines the sequence of
the known binary proposals (without knowing
others’ preferences about these proposals). In her
experiment, the committee votes under simple
majority rule (or with bonus votes). She finds
that—due to the private nature of preferences
over proposals—chairs use the agenda to trans-
mit information about their priorities instead of
exploiting agenda control to form vote trading
coalitions. As preferences over proposals are
private information and the committee votes in a
secret ballot there is little room for vote trading
based on trust and reciprocity. Our work focuses
on decision situations in which preferences are
common knowledge, and varies whether the com-
mittee votes in a secret or open ballot. Thereby,
we show that committee chairs indeed manipu-
late agendas, in particular when individual votes
are observable.
4. For surveys on agenda manipulation see also Cox
(2006) and Cox and Shepsle (2007) as well as the survey
on laboratory voting experiments by Holt (2006) and Palfrey
(2009) which both include experimental studies on committee
decision making and agenda control.
By studying agenda manipulation in a setting
that allows for vote trading, we also complement
the literature on vote trading and logrolling,
going back the seminal contributions by Tullock
(1959), Riker and Brams (1973), and McKelvey
and Ordeshook (1980) and much more recent
contributions by Hortala-Vallve (2011) and
Casella and Palfrey (2019). The main difference
between our contribution and the logrolling
literature is that we analyze agenda setting
possibilities, when formal commitment devices
for vote trades, communication or negotia-
tions are missing. Our results demonstrate that
coalitions do occur even without commitment
devices and communication, and that agenda
manipulation does not impede vote trading
based on trust and reciprocity but may even
emphasize it.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
We build our study on the experimental vot-
ing game introduced by Fischbacher and Schudy
(2014). In the experiment, three participants form
a committee. The committee decides on three
independent proposals. The committee votes
sequentially on each of the three proposals using
simple majority rule. Each proposal can be passed
or failed. First, all committee members simul-
taneously cast their votes on the first proposal.
Then, the committee is informed about the out-
come of the vote. Second, each member casts her
vote for the second proposal. The second vote is
displayed and the group decides on the third pro-
posal. Finally, the outcome of the third vote and
the resulting payoffs are displayed. We induce
symmetric and publicly known preferences over
the proposals on the agenda.5 Each proposal is
strictly preferred by exactly one member of the
committee. Table 1 shows how each proposal
affects the participants’ payoffs. Passing a pre-
ferred proposal yields six additional points for
the beneficiary of the proposal, whereas the other
committee members lose two points each. Thus,
if a proposal is passed, the overall payoff will
increase by two points. Not passing a proposal
does not affect payoffs. Because only one partic-
ipant of the group gains from each proposal, each
5. Thus, we abstract from additional sources which
may affect coalition formation, for instance, the over-
representation of own preference intensities when preferences
are not public (see also Casella 2005; Engelmann and Grimm




Proposals and Resulting Payoff Changes
Proposal A Proposal B Proposal C
Member A +6 −2 −2
Member B −2 +6 −2
Member C −2 −2 +6
single proposal is disadvantageous to a majority
of the group. In turn, proposals can only be
passed, if committee members expect others to
reward support for unfavorable proposals. For the
rest of the paper, we will call a committee mem-
ber who benefits from the first proposal “first
beneficiary” and committee members benefiting
from the second (third) proposal “second (third)
beneficiary.”
A. Treatments
The focus of this study is on how a com-
mittee chair influences the decision-making pro-
cess. In the Chair condition, we randomly select
one participant in each group who assumes the
role of the committee chair. The assignment takes
place at the beginning of the experiment and sub-
jects maintain their role as a chair during the
whole experiment. In each period, one chair is
matched with two nonchairs. The chair deter-
mines the sequence in which the proposals are
put for vote in her committee before the first pro-
posal is voted on and all committee members are
informed about this.
Information on individual voting behavior
is likely to affect trust and reciprocity among
committee members, because it allows for the
identification of supporters. We therefore study
how a committee chair affects voting behavior
under two conditions. In ChairFullInfo, the chair
determines the agenda and the voting proce-
dure is transparent (all votes are observable).
In ChairPartialInfo, the chair determines the
agenda but the ballot is secret, that is, only
the outcome of the vote is displayed but not
individual votes.
We contrast the Chair conditions (Chair-
FullInfo and ChairPartialInfo) with control
conditions in which the agenda is determined
randomly by the computer (RandomFullInfo
and RandomPartialInfo), which was common
knowledge. For these conditions, we use data
from Fischbacher and Schudy (2014), in which
subjects faced the identical situation but the
TABLE 2
Treatments, Sessions, and Matching-Groups
Treatment # Subjects # Sessions
# Matching-
Groups
RandomPartialInfo 54 2 3
ChairPartialInfo 48 2 3
RandomFullInfo 51 2 3
ChairFullInfo 72 3 4
sequence of proposals was determined ran-
domly.6 In all treatments, the sequence of
proposals is displayed to the members of the
committee before voting starts.
To control for learning effects and changes of
voting behavior over time, participants voted on
the three proposals in 12 periods (all payoff rel-
evant). In each period, we randomly matched a
chair with two nonchairs into a group of three par-
ticipants. We use a random matching procedure,
which assured that participants cannot infer any
information on their current counterparts’ indi-
vidual voting behavior from past periods.7 Thus,
we exclude individual reputation building across
periods. Each subject sat at a randomly assigned
and separated computer terminal and was given
a copy of instructions.8 A set of control ques-
tions ensured the understanding of the game. If
any participant answered questions incorrectly,
the experimenter provided an oral explanation.
No form of communication between subjects was
allowed during the experiment.
B. Procedures
All data were collected at the LakeLab (Uni-
versity of Konstanz, Germany). The experiments
took place between December 2008 and May
2009. Altogether we use data from 225 sub-
jects collected in nine sessions. In our Chair
sessions, 120 subjects participated. For the Ran-
dom condition, we use data from 105 subjects
who participated sessions from Fischbacher and
Schudy (2014). Table 2 summarizes the number
of subjects, sessions, treatments, and number
of matching groups per treatment in detail.
None of the subjects participated in more than
6. Note that our Chair treatments were run at the same
time using the same recruitment procedure and the same
subject pool.
7. Depending on the size of the sessions, we formed
matching groups of at least nine participants.
8. A copy of translated instructions can be found in the
Appendix S1, Supporting Information.
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one session. Each session included exactly one
treatment. Participants received a show-up fee of
2 euro ($2.80 at that time). The experiment took
about 1 hour and 15 minutes, average income
was about 12.50 euro ($17.50 at that time). The
experiment was programmed and conducted
using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We recruited
participants using the online recruiting sys-
tem ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Participants were
part of the LakeLab subject pool, consisting of
undergraduate and graduate students of all fields
of study.
IV. BEHAVIORAL PREDICTIONS
When all committee members are selfish, the
sequence of proposals does not affect voting
behavior. In a subgame perfect equilibrium with
selfish committee members, members will vote
all proposals down because each proposal is only
preferred by a minority of the committee and
commitment devices for vote trading are miss-
ing. However, when some committee members
expect reciprocal behavior by their counterparts
they may court for reward by voting on propos-
als preceding their own proposal on the agenda.
Fischbacher and Schudy (2014) derive the fol-
lowing two propositions for RandomPartialInfo
and RandomFullInfo with reciprocal agents.
PROPOSITION 1. The approval of the second
proposal and the approval of the third proposal
is not more likely than the approval of the first
proposal.
PROPOSITION 2. The approval of the third
proposal is not more likely than the approval of
the second proposal.
The two propositions suggest that it is a
weakly dominant strategy for the chair to place
his preferred proposal first. However, the under-
lying assumptions of Proposition 1 are that
committee members vote for their preferred pro-
posal,9 are reciprocal, and do not discriminate
against specific committee members. Reciprocity
ensures that a committee member does not sup-
port other members who did not support her
proposal (if they had a chance to). The nondis-
crimination assumption refers to the fact that a
voter does not differ in her support for others’
proposals, if she has not observed different
9. Note that this assumption is not explicitly mentioned
in Fischbacher and Schudy (2014).
voting behavior by these other members, where
voting behavior is considered as different, if these
members voted differently in otherwise equiv-
alent situations (i.e., if they voted differently
with respect to their own proposal or differently
with respect to another beneficiary’s preferred
proposal). While we consider the latter assump-
tion as natural if the sequence is determined
randomly, it appears less convincing, if the com-
mittee chair determines the sequence in which
proposals are voted on. We will thus test whether
the following null hypotheses can be rejected:
Hypothesis 1: With agenda control, the likeli-
hood of acceptance of (a) the first and second
proposal, as well as (b) the second and third pro-
posal does not differ.
Hypothesis 2: Agenda setters place their
proposals on all positions with equal frequency.
We expect that reciprocal nonchairs may
discriminate against the chair that controls the
agenda. On one hand, reciprocal nonchairs
may positively discriminate against the chair.
First, Charness (2000) has shown that shifting
responsibility from an outcome to an external
authority reduces impulses toward generosity by
alleviating responsibility. Vice versa, if a chair
feels more responsible for the agenda because
she chose it, the chair is likely to reward other
committee members more frequently. In turn,
nonchairs are more likely to support the chair’s
favored proposal. Second, the chair has more
power than other committee members and may
thus receive a higher expected payoff. This could
prevent the chair from compensating low income
periods by exploiting other committee members.
Again, this reasoning provides a rationale for
nonchairs to support the chair’s proposal with a
higher probability. Third, nonchairs may perceive
specific agenda choices as kind and therefore
vote more frequently for the chair’s proposal.
Finally, the mere fact that there exists an agenda
setter may increase the salience of vote trading
possibilities per se and thus lead to more support
for proposals early on the agenda as compared to
a random determination of the agenda.
On the other hand, reciprocal nonchairs may
discriminate negatively against the chair by vot-
ing less frequently or not at all for the chair’s pre-
ferred proposal. Either nonchairs do so because
they consider agenda control per se as morally
problematic, or because they perceive the chair’s
agenda choice as unkind. We consider a gen-
eral negative perception of agenda control less
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likely in our setup, because we do not provide any
default sequence of proposals, that is, the exper-
imental setup “forces” the chair to choose an
agenda. Punishment based on the actual agenda
choice seems instead more plausible, because dif-
ferent positions on the agenda imply different
likelihoods of approval. We expect in particular
beneficiaries of the third proposal on the agenda
to punish the chair because third proposals are
unlikely to be passed, in other words, the opportu-
nity costs of not voting for the chair’s proposal are
lower for the third compared to the second bene-
ficiary. Based on the arguments above, we plan to
test whether the following null hypotheses related
to the agenda setter’s behavior and discrimination
against agenda setters can be rejected:
Hypothesis 3: Agenda setting possibilities do
not affect (a) reward, that is the likelihood of
voting for at least one subsequent proposal when
the own proposal was accepted, and (b) trust,
that is the likelihood of voting for preceding
proposals.
Hypothesis 4: Chairs (a) reward and (b) trust
other committee members as much as nonchairs.
Hypothesis 5: Chairs, who put their preferred
proposal first on the agenda, receive the same
support as beneficiaries of the first proposal in
Random treatments.
Hypothesis 6: Chairs who put their preferred
proposal first on the agenda, receive the same
support by beneficiaries of the second and the
third proposal.
The implicit costs of punishing the chair are
twofold. First, punishing the chair by not vot-
ing for her proposal is costly, because it reduces
the likelihood of support for one’s preferred pro-
posal by the chair. Second, not voting for the
chair’s proposal (when it is placed first on the
agenda) can cause additional distrust among non-
chairs which reduces the likelihood of support
by nonchairs.10 Further, the costs of punishing
are likely to depend on the voting institution.
In ChairFullInfo, the voting procedure is trans-
parent and those who do not support the chair
are accountable. The chair can directly recipro-
cate by not helping them either. In ChairPartial-
Info, chairs cannot directly identify committee
10. Mutual support for each other’s proposal by two
nonchairs requires a lot of trust on the side of the third
beneficiary. If the third beneficiary observed the first proposal
failing, she may distrust the second beneficiary, because the
second beneficiary did not vote for the first proposal.
members who do not vote for the chair’s proposal.
In turn, negative discrimination against the chair
appears more likely to occur in ChairPartialInfo.
Positioning her own proposal first is a weakly
dominant strategy for the chair as long commit-
tee members do not discriminate against spe-
cific committee members. However, if recipro-
cal members perceive such an agenda choice
as unkind, chairs may gain from positioning
their proposal second. If a chair decides to do
so, it is clearly necessary to accompany this
agenda choice by supporting for the first pro-
posal. Assuming some chairs adopt the latter
strategy, we expect higher efficiency if the chair
puts her proposal second on the agenda.
V. RESULTS
We structure the results as follows. First, we
investigate if early proposals are more likely to
be accepted given the agenda is determined by
a committee chair and show that vote trading
coalitions emerge, even if a chair determines the
agenda (Hypotheses 1 and 3). Second, we address
the question of whether the committee chair
manipulates the agenda (Hypothesis 2). Third, we
shed light on chairs’ voting behavior and show
whether the chair exploits other committee mem-
bers (Hypothesis 4). Fourth, we investigate non-
chairs’ behavior toward the chair (Hypotheses 5
and 6). Fifth, we discuss the optimality of the
chair’s decisions as well as the efficiency of the
different institutions.
A. Reciprocal Vote Trading
Figure 1 illustrates individual acceptance
rates of monetarily unfavorable proposals across
treatments. Each column represents the share of
members voting for a proposal that is monetarily
disadvantageous to them.11 Clearly, the earlier a
proposal is voted on, the higher is the probability
of its approval, also if a chair determines the
sequence of the proposals. Regression Models 1
to 4 in Table 3 confirm this finding. Models 1
and 2 estimated the effects for the Random
treatments. Model 1 for instance shows that in
RandomPartialInfo, the probability of accep-
tance of the first proposal is estimated to be 27.6
percentage points higher than the probability of
acceptance of the third proposal and the second
proposal is 14.9 percentage points more likely
11. Subjects accept proposals which increase their own
payoff in 99% of the cases.
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TABLE 3
Probability of Acceptance
Probability of Acceptance of Monetarily Unfavorable Proposals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Random PartialInfo Random FullInfo Chair PartialInfo Chair FullInfo
First proposal 0.276*** 0.550*** 0.267*** 0.463***
(0.012) (0.053) (0.037) (0.052)
Second proposal 0.149*** 0.312*** 0.142*** 0.232***
(0.032) (0.022) (0.026) (0.032)
Period −0.006 −0.004 −0.009*** 0.015***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Observations 1,296 1,224 1,152 1,728
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.153 0.043 0.119
Wald test 𝜒2 = 12.27 𝜒2 = 37.95 𝜒2 = 81.93 𝜒2 = 163.37
H0:First-Second
proposal = 0
p = .001 p = .000 p = .000 p = .000
Note: Probit regression (marginal effects) with robust standard errors and clustering on matching groups. Baseline category
is RandomPartialInfo.
***p< .01; **p< .05; *p< .1.
Bold values indicates p< 0.10.
FIGURE 1

















RandomPartialInfo ChairPartialInfo RandomFullInfo ChairFullInfo
First proposal Second proposal Third proposal
to be accepted than the third proposal. The Wald
tests in the last row of Table 3 show that differ-
ences in the probability of a vote for the first
and the second proposal are significant. Models
3 to 4 show that also for the Chair treatments
early proposals are significantly more likely to
be accepted. Having an agenda setter thus does
not deter vote trading per se. We conclude with
Result 1, indicating that we can reject our null
hypotheses (1a) and (1b):
RESULT 1. Irrespective of agenda control: The
earlier a proposal is voted on, the higher is the
likelihood for the proposal to be accepted.
Figure 1 suggests that both, committee
chairs and information affect voting for others’
proposals. Voting for others’ proposals involves
reciprocity (reward for others’ support) and trust
(voting for preceding proposals). We study next
how agenda control and information on individ-
ual voting behavior affect reward behavior and
then turn to trust among committee members.
First note that reward for others’ support is not
directly comparable across treatments. In the
FullInfo treatments, supporters can be identified
and directly rewarded. In the PartialInfo treat-
ments, reward is undirected and refers to voting
for a subsequent proposal after one’s preferred
proposal was accepted. To make reward in Par-
tialInfo and FullInfo treatments comparable,
we focus on the share of committee members
accepting at least one subsequent proposal given
their own proposal was accepted. The second
column of Table 4 shows that reward occurs
more frequently in the Chair treatments. In
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TABLE 4
Reward and Trusting Behavior across Treatments (Shares in Percent)
Reward Behavior Trusting Behavior
Share of First and Second
Beneficiaries Voting for at least
One Subsequent Proposal When
Own Proposal Was Accepted
Share of Second and Third
Beneficiaries Voting for the
First Proposal
Treatment By Second and Third By Second By Third
RandomPartialInfo 24 35 47 22
N 204 432 216 216
ChairPartialInfo 38 45 58 31
N 231 384 192 192
RandomFullInfo 30 67 79 56
N 312 408 204 204
ChairFullInfo 44 75 86 65
N 488 576 288 288
TABLE 5
Reward and Trusting Behavior
Reward Behavior Trusting Behavior
Dependent Variable
Vote for at least One
Subsequent Proposal Vote for First Proposal
by First and Second By Second and Third By Second By Third
RandomFullInfo 0.080 0.277*** 0.252*** 0.301***
(0.061) (0.056) (0.033) (0.099)
ChairPartialInfo 0.157** 0.091 0.091 0.090
(0.069) (0.112) (0.076) (0.164)
ChairFullInfo 0.215*** 0.363*** 0.333*** 0.392***
(0.078) (0.066) (0.032) (0.111)
Observations 1,235 1,800 900 900
Pseudo R-squared 0.020 0.094 0.097 0.096
#Clusters 13 13 13 13
p value of Wald test for H0:
ChairFullInfo–RandomFullInfo = 0
0.089 0.145 0.160 0.256
Note: Probit regression (marginal effects) with robust standard errors and clustering on matching groups. Baseline category
is RandomPartialInfo.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
Bold values indicates p< 0.10.
ChairPartialInfo, 38% of committee members
accept at least one subsequent proposal, if their
own proposal is accepted whereas this share
amounts to 24% in RandomPartialInfo. Simi-
larly, the share is higher in ChairFullInfo (44%)
than in RandomFullInfo (30%). We confirm this
result econometrically using Probit regressions.
In the second column of Table 5, we estimate the
probability to vote for (at least one) subsequent
proposal after one’s monetarily preferred pro-
posal has been accepted. The regression reveals
a significant positive effect of the chair treat-
ment and a positive but statistically insignificant
effect of the information condition on reciprocal
behavior.12 The Wald test in the last row confirms
12. Information does not significantly affect the reward
measure that is comparable across treatments (i.e., the like-
lihood of accepting at least one subsequent proposal given
that the ChairFullInfo treatment yields a higher
reward probability than RandomFullInfo. We
thus reject Hypotheses (3a) and conclude with
Result 2:
RESULT 2. Agenda control has a positive influ-
ence on reciprocity.
the own proposal was accepted). Nevertheless, as intu-
ition suggests, information significantly increases behavior
akin to tit-for-tat: The likelihood that a beneficiary of a
passed proposal directly rewards her supporter(s) is sig-
nificantly higher in FullInfo (using Probit regressions with
dummies for FullInfo and Chair conditions and cluster-
ing on matching groups). However, this outcome measure
relies on information that is not available to decision mak-
ers in PartialInfo. Here, beneficiaries only know whether
their proposal was passed, but not who supported their
proposal such that “direct reward” can only occur due
to chance.
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As a measure of trust, we focus on the
acceptance of the first proposal by second and
third beneficiaries.13 Columns 3 to 5 in Table 4
show the share of supporters of the first pro-
posal. The numbers suggest that agenda control
and transparency increase trust. Using Probit
regressions, we find however that only the latter
difference is statistically significant. As can be
seen in Table 5 (column 3 to 5), trust is higher
in FullInfo treatments compared to PartialInfo.
The regression model estimates the probability
of voting for the first proposal by second and
third beneficiaries. The baseline category is
RandomPartialInfo. Compared to this baseline,
RandomFullInfo yields an increase of 27.7 per-
centage points in the probability of a vote for the
first proposal by second and third beneficiaries.
ChairPartialInfo does not significantly increase
the probability of a vote for the first proposal
by second and third beneficiaries compared to
the baseline (RandomPartialInfo). While Chair-
FullInfo yields an increase of 36.3 percentage
points in the estimated probability compared to
the baseline RandomPartialInfo, the coefficient
is not significantly different from the coefficient
of RandomFullInfo (as shown by the Wald-test
result reported in the last row of Table 5).
While our Chair conditions significantly
increase reward, we cannot reject that the
Chair conditions do not affect trusting behavior
(Hypothesis 3b). This does not necessarily mean
that decision makers fail to backward induct.
Changes in trusting behavior across treatments
appear in line with changes in net benefits from
trusting. While Chair conditions increase the
expected net benefits from trusting in both infor-
mation conditions, these benefits are negative
with PartialInfo, such that trust does not pay in
expectation. Vice versa, with FullInfo, the net
expected benefits are positive (irrespective of the
Chair condition).14 In turn, even though Chair
13. Note that treatment effects are robust to alternative
specifications of the trust measure (e.g., using the acceptance
of all preceding proposals). We report the acceptance of
the first proposal to be able to show also differences in
trust by the second and third beneficiary. As can be seen in
Table 4 (columns 4 and 5), second beneficiaries trust more
frequently in the first beneficiary than third beneficiaries. This
difference is statistically significant (using Probit regressions
with clustering on matching groups). We discuss behavior of
the second and third beneficiary in more detail in Section D.
14. For the second beneficiary, the expected net bene-
fit from accepting (as compared to not accepting) the first
proposal amounts to −0.31 in RandomPartialInfo, −0.05 in
ChairPartialInfo, 1.15 in RandomFullInfo and 2.40 in Chair-
FullInfo. For the third beneficiary, the expected net benefits
are −1.04 in RandomPartialInfo, −0.48 in ChairPartialInfo,
conditions increase net expected benefits, risk
neutral committee members are not expected
to trust differently when a chair determines
the agenda. In contrast, FullInfo changes the
expected net benefits from trusting from negative
to positive values. And indeed, FullInfo increases
trust significantly. Finally, in line with previous
work, trusting behavior in conditions with neg-
ative expected net benefits can be explained
by efficiency concerns or social preferences
(see Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 2007; Cox
2004) whereas reluctance to always trust when
expected returns are positive may result from risk
or betrayal aversion (see Bohnet and Zeckhauser
2004).
B. Choice of the Agenda
Figure 2 shows the chairs’ agenda choices
over time for ChairPartialInfo and Chair-
FullInfo. In contrast to Hypothesis 2, most chairs
place their preferred proposal first on the agenda.
On average, committees vote on the chair’s pro-
posal first in 61% of the cases. Notably, in 31%
of chairs chose to place their proposal second
position. The chairs preferred proposal is rarely
placed third (in 8% of the cases). Figure 2 further
indicates that chairs learn that placing the own
proposal first is profitable. Over time committees
vote more and more frequently on the chairs
proposal first. The regressions in Table 6 confirm
this result. Notably, although we observe some
learning, most chairs, who place their proposal
first, behave consistently. In ChairFullInfo,
66.7% of chairs place their preferred proposal
first in 7 or more out of 12 periods (50% do so
in 10 or more periods). In ChairPartialInfo, 50%
of chairs place their preferred proposal first in 7
or more out of 12 periods (37.5% do so in 10 or
more periods). Chairs who place their proposal
second are not only less frequent but also less
consistent. In ChairFullInfo, 29.2% of chairs
choose to place their preferred proposal second
in 7 or more out of 12 periods (only 16.6% do so
in 10 or more periods).
In ChairPartialInfo, 25% of chairs place their
preferred proposal second in 7 or more out of
12 periods (none do so in 10 or more periods).
Placing the proposal third is rare and only one
chair (in ChairPartialInfo) decided to place her
proposal third in 7 or more out of 12 periods
0.59 in RandomFullInfo, and 1.58 in ChairFullInfo. The net
expected benefits from trust in the second beneficiary amount
to −0.97 in RandomPartialInfo, −0.57 in ChairPartialInfo,
0.22 in RandomFullInfo and 0.45 in ChairFullInfo.
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FIGURE 2
















Probability of Voting on the Chair’s Proposal First
Pr(Chair’s Proposal Is Voted on First)
Dependent Variable ChairPartialInfo ChairFullInfo Both Chair treatments
ChairFullInfo 0.082
(0.099)
Period 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
# clusters 3 4 7
Observations 192 288 480
Pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.032 0.033
Note: Probit regression (marginal effects) with clustering on matching groups (3 in ChairPartialInfo and 4 in
ChairFullInfo), Baseline category is ChairPartialInfo. Period captures the time trend, robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
Bold values indicates p< 0.10.
(none did so in 10 or more periods). We conclude
with Result 3:
RESULT 3. The majority of chairs place their
preferred proposal first on the agenda (irre-
spective of information on individual voting
behavior).
C. Chairs’ Voting Behavior
We now turn to chair’s voting behavior and
address first the question of whether and how
much chairs reward other committee members’
support. To answer this question, we discuss
reciprocity by chairs and nonchairs in the full
and partial information treatments. In the full
information treatments, we compare the prob-
ability of acceptance of the second (or third)
proposal by beneficiaries of the first proposal
given the second (third) beneficiary voted for the
first proposal.15 The first two rows of Table 7
show the shares of second (and third) proposals
accepted by first beneficiaries, given the second
(or third) beneficiary accepted the first proposal.
We present chairs’ reward behavior in the first
column, nonchairs’ reward behavior in the second
column. As an additional benchmark, we report
reward behavior by first beneficiaries in the Ran-
dom treatments in the third column. In Chair-
FullInfo, there is no difference in direct reward
by chairs and nonchairs with respect to bene-
ficiaries of the second proposal on the agenda.
About 48% of these proposals are supported by
first beneficiaries. The share of third proposals
accepted by chairs (44%) tends to be higher than
15. In full information, treatments we observe a typical
tit-for-tat behavior. Subsequent proposals are mainly accepted
when their beneficiary supported a preceding proposal. First
beneficiaries vote for the second (third) proposal in only 4.8
(2.6) percent when they received no support by the second
(third) beneficiary.
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TABLE 7
Reward by First Beneficiaries (Chairs and Nonchairs), Shares in Percent
Chair Treatments
By Chair By Nonchair Random Treatments
FullInfo
Reward for beneficiary of the second proposal 48 48 39
N 161 86 161
Reward for beneficiary of the third proposal 44 32 25
N 111 76 114
PartialInfo
Reward for beneficiary of the second proposal 46 30 24
N 65 67 124
Reward for beneficiary of the third proposal 48 13 17
N 65 67 124
Note: In Full Information, treatments reward refers to the share of second (or third) proposals accepted by beneficiary of the
first proposal when the beneficiary of the second (or third) proposal voted for the first proposal. In Partial Information, treatments
reward refers to the share of second or third proposals accepted by the beneficiary of the first proposal when first proposal was
approved by the committee (i.e., either second or third beneficiary, or both, voted for the first proposal).
TABLE 8
Reward for Second and Third Beneficiaries by First Beneficiary
FullInfo PartialInfo










Chair treatment 0.081 (0.109) 0.056 (0.106) 0.086** (0.042) −0.023 (0.068)
Vote by committee chair −0.011 (0.086) 0.108 (0.097) 0.149*** (0.054) 0.334*** (0.092)
Positive experience in past periods 0.111 (0.109) 0.106 (0.163) 0.018 (0.108) 0.048 (0.077)
Observations 382 281 228 228
Pseudo R-squared 0.009 0.026 0.038 0.098
Note: Probit regression (marginal effects), robust standard errors in parentheses. In FullInfo, reward refers to the share of
second (or third) proposals accepted by beneficiary of the first proposal when the beneficiary of the second (or third) proposal
voted for the first proposal. In PartialInfo, reward refers to the share of second or third proposals accepted by the beneficiary of
the first proposal when first proposal was accepted by the committee (i.e., either second or third beneficiary, or both, voted for
the first proposal).
***p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1.
Bold values indicates p< 0.10.
the share of third proposals accepted by nonchairs
(32%) and also higher than the share of third
proposals accepted by first beneficiaries in Ran-
domFullInfo (25%). Regression Models 1 and 2
in Table 8 show that the differences in behavior
in the FullInfo treatments are however insignifi-
cant. In addition to the treatment and chair dum-
mies, the regressions include a measure of posi-
tive past experience as a control variable. Positive
experience is measured as the share of accepted
own proposals until the current period. Positive
experience does not affect reward significantly.16
The third and fourth row of Table 7 show the
shares of accepted second and third proposals by
first beneficiaries (given the first proposal was
16. The results of Models 1 and 2 in Table 8 are robust to
excluding the experience measure.
accepted) for the PartialInfo treatments. Chairs
support later proposals more frequently than
nonchairs (46 vs. 30% for the second proposal
and 48 vs. 13% for the third proposal) and also
more frequently than first beneficiaries in the
ChairPartialInfo (17%). Regression Models 3
and 4 in Table 8 show that chairs in the Chair-
PartialInfo reward support significantly more
than nonchairs.17 Model 3 estimates chairs to be
14.9% points more likely to reward the second
beneficiary than nonchairs in ChairPartialInfo.
Model 4 estimates that the probability of reward
by chairs to be 33.4 percentage points higher
than the reward probability by nonchairs in
17. Excluding the positive experience variable in Models
3 and 4 does not affect Model 4. In Model 3, the coefficient




Shares of First Proposals Voted for by Second (Third) Beneficiaries
Chair Treatments
Vote for first proposal By Chair By Nonchair Random Treatments
By beneficiaries of the second proposal
Full information 87 85 79
N 87 201 204
Partial information 72 52 47
N 60 132 216
By beneficiaries of the third proposal
Full Information 63 65 56
N 16 272 204
Partial information 42 30 22
N 24 168 216
ChairPartialInfo. We thus reject Hypothesis (4a)
and conclude with Result 4:
RESULT 4. Chairs reward support more fre-
quently than nonchairs in PartialInfo.
Next, we turn to chairs’ trusting behavior.
Table 9 shows the frequency of support for the
first proposal by second and third beneficiaries
(separately for chairs and nonchairs). As an addi-
tional benchmark, the third column in Table 9
reports support for the first proposal by second
and third beneficiaries in the Random treatments.
Table 9 suggests that chairs trust more than non-
chairs and they trust in particular more than sub-
jects in the condition without agenda control.
We test whether these differences are statisti-
cally significant using probit regressions. Model
1 in Table 10 shows that support for the first
proposal is slightly more likely in ChairFullInfo
than in RandomFullInfo.18 However, chairs do
not support the first proposal significantly more
frequently than nonchairs. Again, we include our
measure for positive experience (the share of own
proposals passed in the preceding periods) as an
explanatory variable.
RESULT 5. Chairs do not trust more frequently
than nonchairs.
D. Reciprocity toward the Chair
We now turn to the question whether non-
chairs discriminate against chairs. We focus
on the situation in which the committee chair
determines the agenda and investigate whether
18. We refrain from reporting results from regression
specifications in which the dependent variable is the vote for
the first proposal by third beneficiaries, as chairs rarely chose
to have their proposal vote on last.
TABLE 10
Votes for First Proposal by Second Beneficiaries










Chair treatment 0.061** −0.003
(0.030) (0.137)
Vote by chair 0.008 0.154
(0.032) (0.160)
Positive experience 0.241** 0.329***
(0.096) (0.121)
Observations 451 374
Pseudo R-squared 0.061 0.039
Note: Probit regression (marginal effects), robust
standard errors in parentheses. The regressions reveal that
positive experience is the driving force for support of the
first proposal. We thus cannot reject Hypothesis (4b) and
conclude with Result 5.
***p< .01; ** p< .05; * p< .1.
Bold values indicates p< 0.10.
nonchairs support proposals preferred by chairs
more or less frequently than proposals preferred
by other nonchairs. As an additional benchmark,
we compare support for the chair’s proposal
to support for proposals placed in the same
position on the agenda in the corresponding Ran-
dom treatment. Table 11 shows the frequency
with which the chair’s proposal is supported,
if the chair places the own proposal first. Let
us first focus on support for the first proposal
by the second beneficiary. As can be seen in
Table 11 (column 2 to 4), with FullInfo, the
second beneficiary supports the chair’s proposal
more frequently than a nonchair’s proposal that
is placed in the same position on the agenda.
With FullInfo, nonchairs who prefer the second
proposal accept first proposals 87% of the time,
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TABLE 11
Votes for First Proposal by Nonchairs Preferring Second or Third Proposal (in Percent)
Vote by… Beneficiary of Second Proposal Beneficiary of Third Proposal
Chair Treatment Chair Treatment
First Proposal Preferred by First Proposal Preferred by
Chair Nonchair Random Treatment Chair Nonchair Random Treatment
FullInfo 87 63 79 60 76 56
N 185 16 204 185 87 204
PartialInfo 54 46 47 19 48 22
N 108 24 216 108 60 216
if the first proposal is preferred by the chairs, as
compared to 63%, if the first proposal is preferred
by another nonchair.19 In RandomFullInfo, 79%
of first proposals are supported by second bene-
ficiaries. Also with partial information, the share
of first proposals supported by second benefi-
ciaries tends to be higher if the first proposal
is preferred by the chair. Regression Model 1
in Table 12 confirms that second beneficiaries
are significantly more likely to support the first
proposal, if this proposal is preferred by the
committee chair. Vice versa, the third beneficiary
supports the first proposal less frequently, if it is
preferred by the agenda setter as compared being
preferred by another nonchair. As can be seen in
Table 11 (columns 4 to 6), with FullInfo, third
beneficiaries on average support 76% of first
proposals preferred by nonchairs whereas this
share amounts to only 60% if the first proposal
is preferred by the committee chair. In Random-
FullInfo, treatment support for the first proposal
by the third beneficiary amounts to 56%. This
pattern is even more pronounced with partial
information. In RandomPartialInfo, 48% of
nonchairs support the first proposal whereas only
19% of third beneficiaries do so in ChairPartial-
Info. In RandomPartialInfo, support for the first
proposal by the third beneficiary amounts to 22%.
Hence, we observe on average slightly more sup-
port for the first proposal in ChairFullInfo (and
ChairPartialInfo) than in RandomFullInfo (and
RandomPartialInfo),20 but, within the Chair
treatments, chairs who prefer the first proposal
19. Note that in the latter case, the agenda setter’s pre-
ferred proposal is last on the agenda, which happened on aver-
age in about 8% of the cases.
20. On average (pooling information treatments and
votes by second and third beneficiaries), agenda setters
receive statistically insignificantly more support when plac-
ing their preferred proposal first as compared to beneficiaries
of the first proposal in the random treatments (marginal effect:
0.093 p = .38, probit regression analyses with clustering on
matching groups, controlling for experience, not included in
the paper). We thus cannot reject Hypothesis 5.
TABLE 12
Trust in First Beneficiary by Nonchairs








FullInfo treatments 0.309*** 0.339***
(0.050) (0.061)
Chair treatments −0.122** 0.218***
(0.059) (0.080)
Chair is first beneficiary 0.176*** −0.186***
(0.024) (0.041)






Pseudo R-squared 0.145 0.187
Note: Probit regression with clustering on matching groups,
robust standard errors (in parentheses)
***p< .01; ** p< .05; * p< .1.
Bold values indicates p< 0.10.
receive less support by nonchairs than first ben-
eficiaries who have no agenda control; that is,
third beneficiaries punish chairs. The difference
in punishment by third beneficiaries is higher
in the partial information treatment (19 vs.
48% compared to 60 vs. 76%) but, as shown
in Section B, punishment does not stop chair’s
from positioning their preferred proposal first.
Regression Model 2 in Table 12 confirms that,
within the Chair treatments, third beneficiaries
vote less frequently for the first proposal if the
beneficiary is the committee chair. We thus reject
Hypothesis 6 and summarize these findings in
Result 6.
RESULT 6. If the chair positions her proposal
first, second beneficiaries support the first pro-
posal more frequently whereas third beneficiaries
support the first proposal less frequently.
How do nonchairs treat the chair when the
chair does not choose the first position? Is the
chair additionally rewarded in this case such that
it pays off for chairs to place their proposal
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FIGURE 3









































First Bill Second Bill Third Bill
second? Figure 3 shows the share of votes for
unfavorable proposals, conditional on the posi-
tion chosen by the chair. It shows that in the full
information treatment, the first position yields the
highest probability to pass a proposal followed
by the second position and the third. In the par-
tial information treatment, the second position
yields about the same probability to receive sup-
port as the first position. However, if the chair
chooses to place her proposal second, she has to
support the first proposal, which results in a lower
expected income.
E. Efficiency
Let us conclude the results section with
some remarks on the efficiency effects of our
treatments. As the number of proposals cor-
responds one-to-one to efficiency, we show
the number of proposals accepted in Table 13.
Transparency of the voting procedure has a
positive and significant impact on the number
of proposals passed.21 In the ChairFullInfo, on
average 2.16 proposals are passed, whereas in
ChairPartialInfo, 1.53 proposals are accepted. In
RandomFullInfo, 1.75 proposals are on average
accepted whereas in RandomPartialInfo, only
1.14 proposals are accepted. Table 13 suggests
that the Chair treatments also increase the num-
ber of proposals accepted. However, the increase
in accepted proposals due to agenda control is
21. Results from a regression analysis with clustering
on matching groups controlling for agenda control treatment
(not included in the paper). As already indicated in Table 4,
transparency reduces in particular voting outcomes, in which
no proposal is passed. This outcome occurs only in about
3% in the full information treatments (RandomFullInfo and
ChairFullInfo) whereas it occurs in about 31% of cases in
the partial information treatments (RandomPartialInfo and
ChairPartialInfo).
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TABLE 13
Average Number of Proposals Passed According to Chair’s Position (SD)
Chair Treatments Random Treatments
Chair Is… ChairFullInfo ChairPartialInfo RandomFullInfo RandomPartialInfo
First beneficiary 2.11 (0.76) 1.44 (1.26) — —
N 555 324
Second beneficiary 2.36 (0.80) 1.70 (0.99) — —
N 261 180
Third beneficiary 1.69 (0.59) 1.46 (1.16) — —
N 48 72
Total 2.16 (0.78) 1.53 (1.17) 1.75 (0.81) 1.14 (1.06)
N 864 576 612 648
only statistically significant, if the chair places
her proposal second.22 Chairs, who position their
proposal second, give up a potential gain for
themselves because it is only reasonable to place
the own proposal second, if the chair also sup-
ports the first proposal. Chairs who position their
proposals second do not only intend to increase
their own but also others’ profits. However, we
find rather few of these types. In ChairFullInfo,
less than a third of chairs choose to place their
preferred proposal second in 7 or more out of
12 periods and only one sixth does so in 10 or
more periods. In ChairPartialInfo, one-fourth of
chairs place their preferred proposal second in
7 or more out of 12 periods and none do so in
10 or more periods. The majority of chairs place
their proposal first: in ChairFullInfo, two-thirds
of chairs place their preferred proposal first in 7
or more out of 12 periods (half of the chairs do
so in 10 or more periods). In ChairPartialInfo,
half of chairs place their preferred proposal first
in 7 or more out of 12 periods (more than a third
do so in 10 or more periods).
VI. CONCLUSION
How valuable is it for a committee chair to
control the sequence in which a series of binary
proposals is voted on? This article shows that the
answer to this question crucially depends on how
much room the specific voting institution leaves
for trust and reciprocity to matter. While earlier
work has shown that agenda setting possibilities
hinge on the information about other committee
members’ preferences (see also Ordeshook and
Palfrey 1988), the specific voting procedure of
the decision-making process (e.g., forward vs.
22. Results from a regression analysis with clustering on
matching groups controlling for agenda control treatment (not
included in the article).
backward agendas, see Wilson 1986), and com-
mittee members’ voting behavior,23 our study
highlights that reciprocity among committee
members can yield additional agenda setting
possibilities, as reciprocal vote trading occurs,
even when a committee chair manipulates the
agenda. The results show that committee chairs
in our experimental voting game take trust and
reciprocity among committee members into
account when setting the agenda. Although
chairs only control the sequence in which the
binary proposals are voted on, they are able
to shift the voting outcome in the direction of
their own interest. Hence, the presumption that
inequality in the ability to manipulate may be
perceived as problematic (Satterthwaite 1973,
5–16) does not hinder agenda setters to partially
exploit their position.24 Committee chairs are
not supported less frequently in general. Instead,
they are able to manipulate the agenda. Only
committee members suffering from the chosen
voting sequence punish the chair (particularly
when the voting procedure is secretive) whereas
those who gain from the chosen agenda vote
more frequently for the chair’s proposal. Finally,
chairs do not behave completely selfish but
reward support by other committee members
more frequently than nonchairs, in particular
when the voting is secretive.25
23. For example, the number of feasible outcomes
depends on whether voters are sincere or sophisticated.
Sophisticated voting is also closely related to vote trading (see
also Brams and Riker 1973), which is the basis of our study.
24. Satterthwaite (1973, 5–16) names five reasons why
agenda setting may be perceived problematic, among them
the inequality in skills (some committee members are able
to manipulate, others are not). For a detailed discussion of
Satterthwaite’s arguments see also van Hees and Dowding
(2008).
25. This behavior may also reflect distributional pref-
erences which have been observed, for example, in Baron-
Ferejohn type of majoritarian bargaining experiments, where
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Earlier work has shown that reciprocity plays
a minor role if information about preferences is
private (see Casella 2011). Our findings highlight
that reciprocity matters for agenda manipulation
if preferences are common knowledge, and
even more so, if voting behavior is observable.
These results yield important implication for
the design of voting institutions. In particular,
trust and reciprocity have to be considered if
one discusses the merits of transparent voting
institutions. In the experiment, transparency—in
form of public information about individual
voting behavior—increased the number of vote
trades significantly. While such trades were
efficient in our setup (by design), transparency
may also reduce social welfare trough inefficient
vote trades in alternative settings. Although the
experiment was not designed to evaluate whether
transparent voting institutions are superior in
general, our results indicate that one major effect
of transparency is an increase in committee
members’ trust in the reciprocity of their coun-
terparts that translates into an increase in the
extent to which the committee chair can exploit
her control over the agenda.
With respect to reciprocal reactions to agenda
manipulation, our results provide insights into
how people attribute responsibility to a com-
mittee chair who controls the order in which a
series of binary proposals is voted on. Committee
members punish the chair’s agenda choice but do
not dislike agenda control per se. While commit-
tee members are well aware of the fact that they
suffered or benefited from a chosen agenda (and
thus they are aware about the fact that the agenda
was manipulated), they may not perceive manip-
ulation as particularly unfair in our setting. The
chair had to choose some agenda, and the role
of the chair was determined randomly. Previous
research has shown that people care about fair-
ness in procedures (see Akbaş, Ariely, and Yuksel
2019; Grimalda, Kar, and Proto 2016; Karni,
Salmon, and Sopher 2008; Ku and Salmon 2013),
and random procedures are often perceived as
particularly fair. For instance, Ku and Salmon
(2013) use various criteria of how advantageous
and disadvantageous roles in an experiment are
determined (random choice, meritocratic choice,
arbitrary determination, or giving advantageous
roles to uncooperative decision makers) and find
proposers do not fully exploit their agenda control by pro-
viding benefits to all committee members rather than to a
minimum winning coalition.
that random determination of roles increases par-
ticipants’ willingness to approve Pareto improve-
ments that favor players in advantageous roles. It
is thus interesting to think about extensions of the
current experimental setup, which may affect the
likelihood of general resistance to agenda manip-
ulation. For instance, our setting allows to study
whether agenda setters who explicitly change a
default agenda results in more negative reactions
to agenda manipulations (as defaults may make
committee members form references points
about payoffs, see also Charité, Fisman, and
Kuziemko 2015). Further, complementing recent
literature on responsibility attribution in political
decision-making (see Bartling, Fischbacher, and
Schudy 2015; Duch, Przepiorka, and Steven-
son 2015), it will be interesting to study how
reciprocal reactions to agenda manipulation
change if the committee chair “earned” her posi-
tion or achieved the position in dubious ways.
For instance, nonchairs may hold a committee
chair less (or more) responsible, if the chair was
elected (or bribed members to become the agenda
setter). Further, in larger committees, it would
be interesting to vary the institutional setting by
allowing for abstention or requiring a quorum.
Finally, future research may also investigate the
role of transparency in voting contexts, in which
committee members (and committee chairs)
have re-election concerns and affected third
parties can observe and react to the committee’s
decisions.
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